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DAMAGES FOR A DECEDENT'S PRE-IMPACT
FEAR: AN ELEMENT OF DAMAGES UNDER
ALASKA'S SURVIVORSHIP STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have recently begun to recognize the recoverability of a
new type of damages in survivorship actions: damages for the pre-
impact fear' of decedents. This "new" element of survivorship recov-
ery, developed from a series of cases involving aircraft crashes, is being
increasingly relied upon in cases involving more commonplace occur-
rences such as automobile accidents. Despite the substantial liabilities
which may be generated by such claims, pre-impact fear thus far re-
ceived surprisingly little analytical attention.
The theory of pre-impact fear is straightforward. The aircraft
cases typically involve some sort of mechanical failure that causes an
aircraft to crash. At some point in time, the flight pattern of the air-
craft or a warning from the pilot informs the passengers that a crash is
imminent. Thus, a passenger may become aware that he or she may
be killed. Even though a passenger may be killed instantly once the
actual impact occurs, the passenger may have suffered extreme mental
anguish prior to impact due to the knowledge of impending death.
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1. The term "pre-impact fear" will be employed throughout this note. As used,
it means fear, terror, and mental anguish experienced when an individual apprehends
that an impending impact or injury will likely result in the death of the individual.
Other terms used to describe this phenomenon include "pre-impact fright," Nye v.
Commonwealth, 331 Pa. Super. 209, 216, 480 A.2d 318, 322 (1984), "pre-impact fear
and terror," In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, 507 F. Supp. 21, 22 (N.D. Ill.
1980), "pre-impact mental anguish," Douglass v. Delta Air Lines, 709 F. Supp. 745,
765 (W.D. Tex. 1989), modified on other grounds, 897 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1990), and
"pre-injury mental anguish," Nelson v. Dolan, 230 Neb. 848, 857, 434 N.W.2d 25, 31
(1989). Some courts, particularly those inclined to evaluate pre-impact fear claims
under an "ordeal" theory, have also referred to "pre-impact pain and suffering." E.g.,
Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1984). Courts using an
emotional distress theory have referred to the phenomenon as "pre-impact emotional
distress." E.g., Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953, 962 (D. Kan.
1986). The term "pre-impact fear" as used in this note should be considered synony-
mous with all such terms.
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It is widely held that damages are recoverable for mental suffering
and physical pain experienced by a decedent between the time of the
fatal impact and death.2 Pre-impact fear is, however, mental anguish
of a very different nature. No physical harm has come to the decedent
when the fear is experienced - it is a purely psychic injury. Courts
confronting claims for damages from pre-impact fear have divided on
how the law should treat such claims. Some have held that pre-impact
fear is mental anguish which is part of a larger, ongoing ordeal. These
courts have allowed recovery for pre-impact fear as part of the award
of damages for conscious pain and suffering. Other courts have
viewed pre-impact fear as a form of negligently-inflicted emotional dis-
tress. Jurisdictions generally allow recovery for negligently-inflicted
emotional distress, but many restrict recovery to those cases in which
there was a physical "impact" upon the person of the plaintiff, or re-
quire that the mental duress be "physically manifested" by some form
of illness or injury.
No published Alaska case addresses the recoverability of damages
for pre-impact fear. This fact would be of little importance to most
practitioners, if pre-impact fear claims were limited to extraordinary
circumstances like those of an airplane crash. In recent cases, how-
ever, pre-impact fear claims have arisen from more common circum-
stances such as automobile accidents. Because nothing in Alaska law
expressly proscribes pre-impact fear claims, this development offers a
rewarding new frontier for plaintiff's attorneys.
This note will analyze the pre-impact fear cases from other juris-
dictions and discuss the two theories which courts have used to ex-
plain the nature of pre-impact fear. It will then discuss current Alaska
law and suggest which of the theories of recovery is more appropriate.
The remainder of the note will discuss evidentiary issues that occur in
connection with pre-impact fear claims. That section will focus on
evidentiary requirements as a tool for "weeding out" inappropriate
claims and will conclude with an analysis of some of the special issues
that may arise if pre-impact fear claims are brought in the context of
an automobile collision.
II. SHOULD ALASKA ALLOW RECOVERY FOR A DECEDENT'S
PRE-IMPACT FEAR?
There is no published Alaska case addressing the recoverability of
damages for a decedent's pre-impact fear in a survivorship action.
This section will analyze the case law on pre-impact fear which has
arisen in other jurisdictions. The section will then review current
2. See Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 793 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 801 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1977).
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Alaska law on survivorship and emotional distress and conclude that
Alaska should allow recovery of damages for a decedent's pre-impact
fear.
A. The Pre-Impact Fear Cases
A number of courts have addressed claims for recovery based on
a decedent's pre-impact fear. Some courts have allowed recovery for
damages from pre-impact fear.3 Some have found damages for pre-
impact fear to be recoverable only subject to the restrictive rules gov-
erning recovery for negligently-inflicted emotional distress. 4 Other
courts have judged the pre-impact fear claim too speculative to allow
recovery under the facts presented.5 Only two courts refused to
3. E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, 789 F.2d 1092, 1098-99 (5th
Cir. 1986) (applying Louisiana law), aff'd in relevant part, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.
1987) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 109 S.Ct. 1928 (1989); Pregeant v. Pan Am.
World Airways, 762 F.2d 1245, 1248-49 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Louisiana law);
Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, 746 F.2d 311, 313-17 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying
Louisiana law); Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying
Florida law), cert denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Platt v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
554 F. Supp. 360, 363-64 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (applying Michigan law); Kozar v. Ches-
apeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 320 F. Supp. 335, 365-66 (W.D. Mich. 1970) (applying Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act), modified on other grounds, 449 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir.
1971); Nelson v. Dolan, 230 Neb. 848, 856-59, 434 N.W.2d 25, 31-32 (1989) (applying
Nebraska law); Yowell v. Piper Aircraft, 703 S.W.2d 630, 634 (rex. 1986) (applying
Texas law); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Lane, 720 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)
(applying Texas law); Green v. Hale, 590 S.W.2d 231, 237-38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)
(applying Texas law).
4. E.g., Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, 746 F.2d 311, 313-15 (5th Cir. 1984)
(applying Louisiana law); Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953,
956-63 (D. Kan. 1986) (applying Kansas law); In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago,
507 F. Supp. 21, 22-24 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (applying Illinois law); Nye v. Common-
wealth, 331 Pa. Super. 209, 215-16, 480 A.2d 318, 321-22 (1984).
5. E.g., Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, 828 F.2d 278, 288 n.43 (5th Cir.
1987); Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1984);
Douglass v. Delta Air Lines, 709 F. Supp. 745, 765-66 (W.D. Tex. 1989), modified on
other grounds, 897 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1990); Larsen v. Delta Air Lines, 692 F. Supp.
714, 721 (S.D. Tex. 1988); Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1301
(D. Conn. 1974).
Cases denying pre-impact fear claims as too speculative have been cited by fed-
eral courts as indicating that a state would allow a claim for pre-impact fear under
different circumstances. See, e.g., Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 53
(2d Cir. 1984) (citing Anderson v. Rowe, 73 A.D.2d 1030, 1031, 425 N.Y.S.2d 180,
181 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)). Such an approach is questionable, since the determina-
tion that a claim is too speculative means that the court need not inquire into the
underlying question of whether or not such a claim is actually cognizable. Shatkin,
727 F.2d at 206-07. Cf. Feldman, 382 F. Supp. at 1301 (dismissing a claim as specula-
tive without inquiring as to compensability under Connecticut law).
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recognize a claim for damages based on a decedent's pre-impact fear.6
Most pre-impact fear cases have held that compensation for a dece-
dent's pre-impact fear is an element of damages in a survival action,
rather than a wrongful death action.7
Although the interval in which pre-impact fear is experienced is
often extremely brief, substantial awards have been assessed as com-
pensation for that fear.8 This fact makes the pre-impact fear cases
6. DeLong v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, No. C2-88-359 (S.D. Ohio July 17,
1989); Case v. Norfolk & W. Ry., C.A. No. S-87-43 (Ohio Ct. App., Sept. 16, 1988).
The correctness of the decisions in these two cases is highly suspect. In Case, a state
court of appeals in Ohio was presented with a claim for pre-impact fear arising from a
collision between a car and a train. The court of appeals noted that there were no
Ohio cases allowing recovery for "pre-impact terror." The court did not expressly
state that Ohio would not recognize a claim for damages from pre-impact fear, but it
did not allow recovery either. The DeLong court, citing only Case, determined that
the Ohio Supreme Court would not recognize a claim for damages based on pre-im-
pact fear. In the alternative, it held that the evidence was insufficient to support the
claim.
The court,; in both Case and DeLong based their determinations on a mere label,
not analysis. It may be true that were no Ohio case in which damages for pre-impact
fear were allowed. However, Ohio has been one of the few jurisdictions which has
allowed a general cause of action for negligently-inflicted emotional distress. See
Shultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983). Pre-impact
fear is emotional distress, and it seems inconceivable that Ohio would allow a general
negligence cause of action based on negligently-inflicted emotional distress, but deny
all recovery if the emotional distress could be labelled "pre-impact fear." An intelli-
gent plaintiff's attorney would simply change the label on the claim from "pre-impact
fear" to "negligently-inflicted emotional distress." The Case court relied on a label
rather than substance, and the DeLong court extended the error by relying on Case.
This note will not address at length the argument that a jurisdiction should sim-
ply disallow any claim purporting to seek damages for pre-impact fear. Allowing re-
covery for pre-impact fear is not allowing a "new" type of damages. Pre-impact fear
claims are "new" only in that recognition of the fact that pre-impact fear is compensa-
ble under the current law is a recent development.
7. See, eg, Nelson v. Dolan, 230 Neb. 848, 853-59, 434 N.W.2d 25, 29-33
(1989). A survivorship action is usually based on a statutory provision which allows
the cause of action in tort to survive an individual's death. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 9.55.570 (1983) (survivorship statute). A wrongful death action is usually based
upon a statute which creates an entirely new cause of action in a personal representa-
tive of a decedent. See id. at § 9.55.580 (wrongful death statute). See also Ismael v.
City Elec. of Anchorage, 91 F. Supp. 688, 690 (D. Alaska 1950) (holding that the
Alaska Wrongful Death Act is not a survival statute).
8. See In re Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, 789 F.2d 1092, 1098-99 ("fi-
nal seconds;" $25,000 jury award lowered to $7,500), aff'd in relevant part, 821 F.2d
1147 (5th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 109 S.Ct. 1928 (1989); Pregeant v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 762 F.2d 1245, 1248 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985) (20 seconds; $16,000
award not excessive); Haley v. Pan Am. Airways, 746 F.2d 311, 317-18 (5th Cir.
1984) (four to six seconds; $15,000 award not excessive); Lin v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1984) (30 seconds; $10,000 award not excessive); Solo-
mon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 793 (5th Cir. 1976) (time not known, but award of
$10,000 for pre-impact fear was "if anything, on the very low side"), cert. denied, 434
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particularly important. Although early pre-impact fear cases typically
dealt with airliner crashes 9 or other unusual fact situations,10 recent
pre-impact fear cases have involved pre-impact fear claims resulting
from more mundane situations such as automobile accidents.' If pre-
impact fear becomes compensable in Alaska, and if it is compensable
in the average automobile accident, then it will become an important
"new" element of damages in many survivorship actions.
Courts have used two major theories to describe the underlying
nature of pre-impact fear. Some courts have characterized it as part of
U.S. 801 (1977); Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. 335, 364 (W.D.
Mich. 1970) (sufficient time to allow decedent to hear warning yell, crouch, and run a
few steps before being crushed by falling refrigerator car; $500 award); Missouri Pac.
R.R. v. Lane, 720 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (six to eight seconds; $19,500
award); Green v. Hale, 590 S.W.2d 231, 237-38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (brief interval
during fall under truck tire; $5,000 not excessive).
9. See, e.g., Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1300-01 (D.
Conn. 1974). Since the crash of an airliner often involves multiple deaths, it is not
surprising that only three crashes account for most of the airliner pre-impact fear
cases. Cases generated from the same accident do not, however, necessarily reach
consistent conclusions. For example, five cases resulted from the crash of an Ameri-
can Airlines DC-10 near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979. Lin v. McDonnell Doug-
las Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1984) (using "ordeal" theory under New York law
and finding sufficient evidence to support claim); Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 727 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding evidence insufficient to support claim and
holding that district court erred in denying motion for J.N.O.V.); Malacynski v. Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp., 565 F. Supp. 105, 106-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding pre-im-
pact fear claim is cognizable under New York law); Platt v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 554 F. Supp. 360, 361 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (finding that Michigan law would
allow a claim for pre-impact fear under an "ordeal" theory); In re Air Crash Disaster
near Chicago, 507 F. Supp. 21, 22 (N.D. I1. 1980) (finding that evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the claim under Illinois law because of "impact rule" for emotional
distress claims). Three other pre-impact fear cases resulted from the crash of Pan
American Flight 759 on July 9, 1982. In re Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, 789
F.2d at 1094 (allowing pre-impact claim but remitting amount of claim); Pregeant v.
Pan Am. World Airways, 762 F.2d 1245, 1247 (5th Cir. 1985) (determining that the
evidence was sufficient to support the claim); Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, 746
F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1984) (recognizing pre-impact fear claim under Louisiana
emotional distress precedent). Finally, two pre-impact cases arose from the crash of
Delta Air Lines Flight 191 on August 2, 1985. Douglass v. Delta Air Lines, 709 F.
Supp. 745, 748 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (determining that there was insufficient evidence
that the particular decedent was aware of the impending crash), modified on other
grounds, 897 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1990); Larsen v. Delta Air Lines, 692 F. Supp. 714,
716 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (determining that there was insufficient evidence that the dece-
dent was aware of the impending crash).
10. See, e.g., Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. 335, 342. (W.D.
Mich. 1970) (decedent crushed by a falling railroad car), modified on other grounds,
449 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971).
11. E.g., Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953, 955 (D. Kan.
1986); Nelson v. Dolan, 230 Neb. 848, 849, 434 N.W.2d 25, 27 (1989); DeLong v.
Schneider Nat'l Carriers, No. C2-88-359 (S.D. Ohio July 17, 1989); Nye v. Common-
wealth, 331 Pa. Super. 209, 211, 480 A.2d 318, 319-20 (1985).
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a tortiously-induced ordeal which is not logically separable into "pre-
injury" and "post-injury" phases. 12 This theory will be referred to
here as the "ordeal" theory. Other courts have held that since pre-
impact fear is not caused by any sort of physical injury and exists
whether or not any injury ever actually occurs, the fear is a form of
negligently-:inflicted emotional distress. 13 This theory will be referred
to as an "emotional distress theory."
Despite their different labels, these two theories do not involve
different conceptions of the nature of pre-impact fear. Rather, they
express different views on how pre-impact fear should be categorized
under the existing legal framework. The distinction between the two
theories is important because the law treats recovery differently de-
pending on the "category" into which pre-impact fear is placed.
Courts adopting an ordeal theory might well allow a claim for pre-
impact fear in a jurisdiction in which adoption of an emotional distress
theory would preclude recovery of such damages. 14
Although these two theories can lead to different results, both
theories are tenable and supported by logic. Determining which the-
ory is more appropriate under Alaska law requires an understanding
of the rationale behind both theories, as well as the current state of
wrongful death, survivorship and emotional distress jurisprudence in
Alaska.
1. The "'Ordeal" Theory of Pre-impact Fear. The Fifth Circuit
provided one of the earliest discussions of the rationale for allowing
12. See, e.g., Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1984);
Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 793 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801
(1977); Platt v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 554 F. Supp. 360, 363-64 (E.D. Mich.
1983); Nelson v. Dolan, 230 Neb. 848, 857, 434 N.W.2d 25, 30-31 (1989).
13. See, e.g., Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, 746 F.2d 311, 313-15 (5th Cir.
1984) (discussing negligently-inflicted emotional distress, but citing Solomon v. War-
ren, 540 F.2d 777, 793-94 (5th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977), a case
adopting an "ordeal" theory); Fogarty, 640 F. Supp. at 956-63; In re Air Crash Disas-
ter near Chicago, 507 F. Supp. 21, 23-24 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Nye v. Commonwealth, 331
Pa. Super. 209, 215-16, 480 A.2d 318, 322 (1984).
This note refers to pre-impact fear as negligently-inflicted emotional distress be-
cause the conduct which proximately causes the death of a particular decedent is usu-
ally negligent rather than intentional. This is not meant to suggest that pre-impact
fear could not be intentionally-inflicted and therefore analyzed under the rules of re-
covery governing intentionally-inflicted emotional distress.
14. Recovery of damages for negligently-inflicted emotional distress is often re-
stricted. The two most common restrictions are often referred to as the "impact rule"
and the "physical manifestation rule." The "impact rule" requires that the emotional
distress be the result of some "impact" upon the person of the plaintiff. The "physical
manifestation rule" restricts recovery to emotional distress which results in some
physical symptom or injury. See generally PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
ToRTs § 54 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
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recovery for pre-impact fear in Solomon v. Warren,15 which involved
the disappearance of a small plane. The pilot's last radio communica-
tion indicated that the aircraft was low on fuel and that he was prepar-
ing to ditch the plane into the Caribbean Sea. Neither the aircraft nor
its occupants were ever found.16 The personal representative of the
passengers brought an action against the pilot under, inter alia, a Flor-
ida survival statute.17 After a bench trial, the district court found the
pilot negligent, and awarded damages for the decedents' conscious
pain and suffering, even though there was no evidence that the dece-
dents had survived the impact or suffered any post-impact pain. The
trial court reasoned that the decedents had experienced pain and suf-
fering when they became aware of the impending crash.18 The Fifth
Circuit sustained the award. 19 Judge Gee dissented, arguing that Flor-
ida required negligently-inflicted emotional distress to be a result of
some physical impact before it was compensable.20 The majority
responded:
[Cases cited by the dissent] simply adhered to the precedent long
prevailing in Florida to the effect that no recovery can be had for
mental pain and suffering unaccompanied by any physical impact,
in the absence of wantonness, wilfuilness or malice ....
The question involved in all such cases is foreign to the subject
here under discussion: If impact to the person is present, may it
follow as well as precede conscious pain and suffering when used as
the basis for recovery for such conscious pain and suffering in an
action under [the] Florida [survivorship statute]?21
The majority answered its own question in the affirmative, stating:
While in the garden variety of claims under survival statutes, in-
cluding the Florida Statute - fatal injuries sustained in automobile
accidents and the like - the usual sequence is impact followed by
pain and suffering, we are unable to discern any reason based on
either law or logic for rejecting a claim because in this case as to at
least part of the suffering, this sequence was reversed. We will not
disallow the claims for this item of damages [pain and suffering] on
that ground. 22
The Solomon court has not been alone in holding that pre-impact
fear is simply a part of the pain and suffering experienced during a
15. 540 F.2d 777, 793 (5th Cir. 1976), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
16. Id. at 780-81.
17. FLA. STAT. § 46.021 (1971).
18. Solomon, 540 F.2d at 792.
19. Id at 793 (2-1 decision on this issue).
20. Id. at 796-97 (Gee, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 793 n.21 (emphasis in original). In Solomon, the language quoted above
terminated with the language, "in an action under Florida Statute section 46.11?". Id
The "46.11" is apparently a typographical error. Earlier citations are to "section
45.11," id., which codifies Florida's survivorship statute.
22. Id at 793 (footnote omitted).
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negligently-induced ordeal. The Second Circuit in Lin v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., was also reluctant to divide the ordeal into "pre-in-
jury" and "post-injury" phases:
A decedent's representative unquestionably may recover for pain
and suffering experienced in a brief interval between injury and
death.... We see no intrinsic or logical barrier to recovery for the
fear experienced during a period in which the decedent is uninjured
but aware of an impending death.23
Similarly, the Nebraska Supreme Court in Nelson v. Dolan decided not
to divide the ordeal into "pre-injury" and "post-injury" phases:
[W]e are persuaded that there exists no sound legal or logical
distinction between permitting a decedent's estate to recover as an
element of damages for a decedent's conscious postinjury pain and
suffering and mental anguish and permitting such an estate to re-
cover for the conscious prefatal-injury mental anguish resulting
from the apprehension and fear of impending death.24
Other courts have also used an "ordeal" theory to hold that pre-im-
pact fear is compensable as an element of conscious pain and suffering.
In Platt v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., a federal district court deter-
mined that Michigan would treat pre-impact fear as a form of pain
and suffering associated with an injury. 25 A Texas court reached a
similar conclusion in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Lane, which in-
volved a decedent killed when a train failed to stop after the decedent's
pickup truck stalled on the railroad tracks.26 The jury awarded dam-
ages for the decedent's physical pain and mental anguish. On appeal,
the railroad argued that the jury erred in awarding damages for physi-
cal pain and mental anguish, since the decedent was killed instantly.
The Court of Appeals of Texas rejected this contention: "Such an ar-
gument fails to consider the terror and consequent mental anguish
Lane faced for the six to eight seconds while he faced imminent
death." 27
The "ordeal theory" advanced in these cases has the advantage of
treating pre-impact fear in a manner that comports with the "reality"
of the situation. Analyzing the fatal event from the vantage point of
hindsight, pre-impact fear is only an element in a larger experience.
This point is best made by reference to cases upholding pain and suf-
fering awards for the mental anguish experienced while drowning.28
23. Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1984) (citation
omitted) (applying New York law).
24. Nelson v. Dolan, 230 Neb. 848, 857, 434 N.W.2d 25, 31.
25. 554 F. Supp. 360, 363-64 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (applying Michigan law).
26. 720 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
27. Id: at 333.
28. See, e.g., Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 839 F.2d 1085, 1092-93 (5th Cir. 1988)
(several hours); Mitchell v. Akers, 401 S.W.2d 907, 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (two to
three minutes).
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The mental anguish associated with drowning is the same as the
mental anguish of a passenger in an airliner spiralling towards the
ground. Both situations involve a type of ordeal in which the decedent
becomes aware of his or her impending demise.
A court using an emotional distress theory for pre-impact fear
resulting from an airliner crash might distinguish the drowning case
by arguing that pre-impact fear in the case of an airliner crash occurs
at an earlier time, before the fatal impact is actually in progress, and
should therefore be treated differently. This division seems arbitrary
and artificial. If there is any distinction at all between the cases, it
may also be a "distinction without a difference." 29 The airline passen-
ger is not afraid because the airliner descends swiftly, and the drown-
ing victim is not afraid because he or she is in the water. The airline
passenger fears that the accident will terminate in a fatal impact. The
drowning victim fears that her struggle in the water will culminate in
suffocation. The ordeal theory treats mental anguish arising from
either type of ordeal in the same manner. There is no need to overrule
the drowning cases or draw such tenuous distinctions under an ordeal
theory.
2. The "Emotional Distress" Theory of Pre-Impact Fear. Some
courts have determined that pre-impact fear is a form of negligently-
inflicted emotional distress.30 This view was first espoused by Judge
Gee, dissenting from the holding in Solomon v. Warren:
We are thus presented with an award for a new element of damages,
apprehension experienced before a death which for all we know was
instantaneous. This is new Florida law conveyed by a federal court.
Under Florida law, mental suffering is not recoverable in the ab-
sence of a physical trauma occasioning it .... The majority pro-
fesses that it has not departed from the impact rule but has only
reversed a sequence to allow recovery when the impact follows the
fear, as well as when the impact precedes the mental suffering. But
to reverse the sequence is to abandon the rationale of the impact
rule: any compensated mental pain and suffering must be caused by
29. Nelson v. Dolan, 230 Neb. 848, 434 N.W.2d 25 (1984), provides some rather
compelling support for this assertion. Nelson involved a collision between a car and a
motorcycle. The defendant's car bumped Nelson's motorcycle, causing the two vehi-
cles to lock together. They traveled, while Nelson struggled to regain control, for
about five seconds before the motorcycle struck a lightpost and rolled under the car.
Nelson was instantly killed. Id at 849-50, 434 N.W.2d at 27. The Nebraska Supreme
Court treated this as a pre-impact fear claim. Id at 854-59, 434 N.W.2d at 30-32. It
is difficult to determine whether a case like this is more like the drowning or the
airliner crash.
30. Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, 746 F.2d 311, 314-15 (5th Cir. 1984); Fo-
garty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953, 956-63 (D. Kan. 1986); In re
Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, 507 F. Supp. 21, 22-24 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Nye v.
Commonwealth, 331 Pa. Super. 209, 215-16, 480 A.2d 318, 321-22 (1984).
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a physical impact. The airplane crash and the Levins' resulting
deaths were not the "but for" cause of whatever anxiety they may
have suffered prior to their deaths. Their prior fears would not have
been diminished had the plane leveled off at the last moment and
avoided disaster altogether. This is because the Levins' anxiety for
their own safety and their children's future wellbeing was caused by
the anticipation of death, not by the actual crash which presumably
killed them. It is not enough that some impact accompany the
mental suffering: the impact must cause the fears if they are to be
compensable. Only then can courts measure mental duress by some
means other than sheer speculation.
3 1
Courts have treated pre-impact fear as emotional distress with va-
rying results. In Haley v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., the court
determined that Louisiana law permitted a general cause of action for
negligently-inflicted emotional distress, and that pre-impact fear could
be considered negligently-inflicted emotional distress. 32 Two other
cases, however, denied recovery for pre-impact fear under the circum-
stances presented. In In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, the dis-
trict court concluded that Illinois law did not permit recovery for
negligently-inflicted emotional distress unless the distress was caused
by bodily injury.33 Since the passengers in the crashing airliner had
not suffered bodily injury before the pre-impact fear was experienced,
the court denied recovery.34 Recovery was also denied in Fogarty v.
Campbell 66 Express, Inc. 35 The Fogarty court held that negligently-
inflicted emotional distress had to result in physical injury before re-
covery would be allowed under Kansas law. Since there was no indi-
cation that the decedent suffered any physical injury resulting from his
fear of the impending truck collision, the court denied recovery.3 6 A
31. Solomon, 540 F.2d at 796-97 (Gee, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (foot-
note omitted).
32. 746 F.2d at 314-15 (citing Stewart v. Arkansas S. Ry., 112 La. 764, 36 So. 676
(1904)). The Haley court also cites and criticizes Reed v. John Deere, 569 F. Supp.
371 (M.D. La. 1983), an earlier case denying recovery for pre-impact fear and terror.
746 F.2d at 314 n.4. In Reed a man was killed when a lawnmower slipped into gear
and backed over him. The district court held that Louisiana did not allow recovery
for loss of enjoyment of future life: "Consequently, the terror that Reed no doubt
experienced when he realized that the machine was going to run over his body is not
compensable." Id. at 378. The Haley court thought the Reed analysis was flawed.
Haley, 746 F.2d at 314 n.4. The Reed analysis is unquestionably sui generis.
33. 507 F. Supp. 21, 22-23 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
34. Id
35. 640 F. Supp. 953, 961-63 (D. Kan. 1986).
36. Id. The Fogarty court clarified that its decision was not an endorsement of the
state of the law in Kansas or of the "physical manifestation rule" itself. Id. at 962-63.
It noted that "a rule denying all recovery to such a genuinely distressed plaintiff seems
both illogical and unenlightened." Id at 963. In dicta, the court suggested that juris-
dictions should "discard most of the rules restricting recovery for emotional distress."
Id
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Pennsylvania superior court reached a similar result in Nye v. Com-
monwealth.37 Assuming arguendo that damages for pre-impact fear
were recoverable, the court noted that Pennsylvania adhered to a
"physical manifestation rule." Therefore, the court held that the es-
tate could not recover damages for pre-impact fright because the estate
did not prove that the decedent suffered physical harm prior to the
impact as a result of her fear of impending death. 38
Although the "impact rule" 39 can present a bar to recovery,
many jurisdictions have allowed even a very minimal impact to suffice
for the purposes of the "impact rule." 4 It is arguable that the lurch-
ing of a damaged airliner, or the jolt to the decedent when he or she
applies the brakes, would satisfy any sort of "impact" requirement.
The "physical manifestation rule,"' 41 however, is very nearly a total
bar to recovery of damages for pre-impact fear. Short-term emotional
distress, even of a very violent nature, is unlikely to result in "seriously
deleterious physical consequences." 42
It can be argued that general principles of tort law support the
notion that pre-impact fear should be treated as negligently-inflicted
emotional distress. Tort recovery for negligence is allowed when there
is: (1) a duty of care; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) proximate cause;
and (4) an injury.43 Pre-impact fear could therefore be treated as neg-
ligently-inflicted emotional distress if the fear constitutes an "injury"
for purposes of the tort. The dissent in Solomon argued that the dece-
dent's fear was a discrete injury - even if the crash never occurred,
the fear would remain. The court in In re Eastern Airlines Engine
Failure44 disagreed. In that case, the crew and passengers of an air-
liner were preparing for a crash at sea when an engine was restarted.
The flight returned safely to the Miami Airport. Passengers brought
suit, claiming that their "pre-impact" fear was negligently-inflicted
emotional distress.45 The court denied recovery, holding that the pas-
sengers had not suffered injury because there had been no impact.
Both In re Engine Failure and Solomon involved an ordeal which
generated fear in the minds of passengers. One ordeal terminated in
37. 331 Pa. Super. 209, 480 A.2d 318 (1984).
38. Id. at 215-16, 480 A.2d at 322 (emphasis in original).
39. For an explanation of the "impact rule," see supra note 14.
40. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, § 54 at 363-64.
41. For an explanation of the "physical manifestation rule," see supra note 14.
42. Annotation, Right to Recover for Emotional Disturbance or Its Physical Conse-
quences, in the Absence of Impact or Other Actionable Wrong, 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 105
(1959 & Supp. 1990).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965); S. SPEISER, C.
KRAUSE & A. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §§ 1:8-1:11 (1983).
44. 629 F. Supp. 307, 309-10 (S.D. Fla. 1986), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989).
45. Id. at 309.
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an engine restart and a safe landing, the other in death. The nature of
the experience was similar in each case, yet the majority in both Solo-
mon and In re Engine Failure would somehow allow the termination
of the ordeal to determine how the law would address mental suffering
experienced during the ordeal. 46 If instead the pre-impact fear is
viewed as a discrete form of injury, the approach adopted in the dis-
senting opinion in Solomon, damages for pre-impact fear would be re-
coverable under the theory of negligently-inflicted emotional distress.
3. The "Emotional Distress" and "Ordeal" Theories Under the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts. At first glance, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts seems to support the conclusion that pre-impact fear
should be treated as negligently-inflicted emotional distress. Section
313 holds a defendant liable for "unintentionally caus[ing] emotional
distress" if it results in bodily injury.47 Negligently caused pre-impact
fear is undeniably "unintentionally cause[d] emotional distress." To
the extent that it might result in bodily injury, it seems to fit within the
recovery scheme outlined in the Restatement.
A closer examination of the Restatement, however, indicates that
it would treat pre-impact fear as conscious pain and suffering if the
impact or event which is feared actually results in bodily harm. Sec-
tion 436A, entitled "Negligence Resulting in Emotional Disturbance
Alone," sets forth the general rule that there is no liability for negli-
gently-inflicted emotional distress, "without bodily harm or other
compensable damage."'48 Section 313 states that there can be liability
for negligently-inflicted emotional distress which causes illness or bod-
ily harm.49 Neither of these sections directly addresses the question of
emotional distress which precedes, but does not result in, fatal injury.
The commentary to section 313(1) seems to address this issue:
In general, as stated in § 436A, there is no liability where the actor's
negligent conduct inflicts only emotional distress, without resulting
46. In other words, if the plunge towards the ground terminated in a crash, pre-
impact fear would be "conscious pain and suffering." Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d
777, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1976) (decided under Florida law). If the plunge terminated in
an engine restart and successful recovery from the dive, then the same pre-impact fear
would be "negjigently-inflicted emotional distress." In re Eastern Airlines, Engine
Failure, 629 F. Supp. at 309-10 (decided under Florida law). Cf Eastern Airlines,
Inc. v. King, 557 So. 2d 574, 576-77 (Fla. 1990) (arising from the same accident as In
re Eastern Airlines, Inc., Engine Failure, this case discusses and approves the impact
requirement under Florida's law of intentionally-inflicted emotional harm). This is a
peculiar result. The fact that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965),
seems to reach the same conclusion will be discussed infra notes 47-57 and accompa-
nying text.
47. R=ESATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965).
48. Id § 436A.
49. Id § 313(1).
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bodily harm or any other invasion of the other's interests. Such
emotional distress is important only in so far as its existence in-
volves a risk of bodily harm, and as affecting the damages recover-
able if bodily harm is sustained. See § 903.50
The commentary indicates that if bodily harm is sustained, emotional
distress does affect the damages recoverable under section 903, which
defines the phrase "compensatory damages" under the Restatement. 5 1
The commentary to section 903 states, "damages given for pain and
humiliation are called compensatory. They give to the injured person
some pecuniary return for what he has suffered .... -s2
The Restatement therefore apparently recognizes two categories
of mental anguish. First, if negligent conduct inflicts only mental
anguish without bodily harm, then there will be no liability unless the
mental anguish itself causes bodily injury. 53 Second, if the negligent
conduct inflicts mental anguish and injury, then the compensatory
damages can reflect the "pain and humiliation" caused by the emo-
tional distress that preceded the injury.54 This is exactly the result
implicit in the decision of the Solomon majority: if negligent conduct
causes pre-impact fear and bodily injury, treat pre-impact fear as an
element in the portion of the compensatory damages attributable to
pain and suffering;55 if the negligent conduct causes only pre-impact
fear, subject pre-impact fear to the restrictions on recovery for negli-
gently-inflicted emotional distress. 56
None of this necessarily invalidates the "emotional distress" the-
ory. Treating pre-impact fear as negligently-inflicted emotional dis-
tress does seem plausible under our current system of tort law
jurisprudence.5 7 However, there are problems with the theory. The
fact that the Restatement supports use of an ordeal theory does seem
to weigh against use of the theory in pre-impact fear cases.
There is an even more important practical problem. Treating
pre-impact fear as negligently-inflicted emotional distress subjects
50. Id § 313(1) comment a.
51. Id § 903.
52. Id § 903 comment a.
53. Id. §§ 313, 436A (this category of mental anguish is what the law calls "negli-
gently-inflicted emotional distress").
54. Id §§ 313(1) comment a, 903 (this category of mental anguish is called "pain
and suffering" and is an element of compensatory damages).
55. See Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1976), cert denied,
434 U.S. 801 (1978).
56. See In re Eastern Airlines, Engine Failure, 629 F. Supp. 307, 309-10 (S.D.
Fla. 1986), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d
1462 (11th Cir. 1989).
57. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, § 54, at n.56 (briefly mentioning the pre-
impact fear cases in the section devoted to negligently-inflicted emotional distress).
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claims for damages from pre-impact fear to certain limitations on re-
covery of damages for negligently-inflicted emotional distress. The ex-
tent of the limitation will depend on the law of the individual
jurisdiction addressing the pre-impact fear claim. With this in mind, it
is appropriate to briefly survey two areas of current Alaska law to
determine how it would handle such claims. First there is the thresh-
old question of whether Alaska law would allow any recovery for pre-
impact fear. Second, it is necessary to examine Alaska's law relating
to negligently-inflicted emotional distress.
B. Current Alaska Law Affecting the Recognition of a Cause of
Action Based on a Decedent's Pre-Impact Fear
If a claim seeking recovery for a decedent's pre-impact fear is
brought in Alaska, two issues will be of crucial importance. The first
issue is whether recovery for pre-impact fear should be permitted.
Courts in other jurisdictions have rarely questioned the proposition
that pre-impact fear could be compensable under the proper circum-
stances. 58 The second issue - how such a claim should be categorized
under the law - is where courts differ. Some have adopted the ordeal
theory and some have adopted the emotional distress theory. This cat-
egorization will be particularly important in jurisdictions which re-
strict recovery for negligently-inflicted emotional distress.
1. AlaskAx Would Allow Recovery of Damages for a Decedent's Pre-
Impact Fear in a Survivorship Action. Alaska has never directly con-
sidered whetiher damages can be recovered for a decedent's pre-impact
fear. One case suggests, however; that such a claim could be cogniza-
ble in a survivorship action. Horsford v. Estate of Horsford59 arose
when a man was killed in an aircraft crash. Wrongful death and survi-
vorship claims were brought, and a single lump-sum settlement was
paid for both claims. The superior court determined that no portion
of the settlement was allocable to the survivorship claim, and the
Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. "We find no error here on the supe-
rior court's part for there is nothing in the record which indicates that
any pain and suffering which William Horsford may have suffered was
other than momentary." 6 In a footnote, the supreme court quoted
the superior court's discussion of the survivorship claim:
58. See, e-., Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953, 961 (D.
Kan. 1986) (holding that recovery for pre-impact fear is permissible if resulting physi-
cal injury is shown). But see DeLong v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, No. C2-88-359, slip
op. at 1-2 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 1989) (holding that Ohio law does not recognize claims
for pre-impact fear, but qualifying this conclusion by relying on the speculative nature
of the claim under the facts of the case).
59. 561 P.2d 722 (Alaska 1977) (2-1 decision, two justices not participating).
60. Id. at 729-30.
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It may very well be true that the decedent suffered substantial
pain, suffering, and mental anguish arising out of the accident in
question but it is equally true that this pain, suffering, and mental
anguish and other elements that are usually associated with a survi-
vorship action came quickly and decisively to a tragic termination
when the plane hit the ground.... The court is of the opinion that
any portion of the total settlement that could be allocable to the
survivorship portion of the action would be insignificant in terms of
the entire settlement.61
The language in Horsford might seem to suggest that "momen-
tary" mental anguish - such as pre-impact fear - is not compensable
in Alaska. Pre-impact fear is not necessarily momentary, however. 62
The cases also distinguish between pre-impact fear and the type of
mental anguish and physical pain associated with the fatal injury
itself.63
Horsford does not state that momentary mental anguish is not
compensable in Alaska, however. The superior court did not merely
conclude that the recovery allowable under the facts of that case was
"insignificant." The supreme court affirmed the superior court deci-
sion because there was no indication "on th[e] record" of pain and
suffering that was other than momentary. 65
Horsford is consistent with the proposition that, in order to justify
a damages award, pre-impact fear must be more than a momentary
awareness substantially contemporaneous with death. 66 It is also con-
sistent with the proposition that a claim for pre-impact fear must be
supported by sufficient evidence. 67 The case implies that if there were
evidence of fear which was more than momentary, a "significant" re-
covery for pre-impact fear could be possible.68
Horsford implies that pre-impact mental anguish of short dura-
tion could be compensable in a survivorship award for pain and suffer-
ing.69 The Alaska Supreme Court has allowed compensation for
61. Id. at 730 ri.22.
62. See, eg., Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1984)
(involving thirty seconds of pre-impact fear).
63. Cf. Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953, 963-64 (D. Kan.
1986) (treating pain or mental anguish associated with the process of the fatal impact
differently from pre-impact fear).
64. Horsford, 561 P.2d at 730 n.22.
65. Id. at 729-30.
66. Cf Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1984)
(disallowing recovery for pre-impact fear when decedent could have been cognizant of
danger only three seconds prior to impact).
67. See, e.g., Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, 746 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir.
1984).
68. Horsford, 561 P.2d at 729-30.
69. Id.
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negligently-inflicted emotional distress. 70 Alaska should allow recov-
ery for pre-impact fear. Alaska courts should not repeat the error
made in Case and deny recovery on the ground that no previous
Alaska case has used the label "pre-impact fear."'71
2. Alaska's Standards for Recovery of Damages for Emotional Dis-
tress. If Alaska placed no restrictions on the recovery of damages for
negligently-inflicted emotional distress, then the debate over which
theory should be used to categorize pre-impact fear claims would be of
little practical significance. Although Alaska law is not completely
clear on the issue, it may be read as retaining a "physical manifesta-
tion requirement." As a result, the theory used to categorize pre-im-
pact fear cases in Alaska may have significant practical ramifications.
Alaska has looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts to deter-
mine the scope of liability for negligently-inflicted emotional distress. 72
The Restatement does not impose liability when negligent conduct in-
flicts only emotional distress. 73 The standard for recovery for negli-
gently-inflicted emotional distress is set forth in Restatement section
313:
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to an-
other, he is subject to liability to the other for resulting illness or
bodily harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved an unrea-
sonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise than by
knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person, and
(b) from facts known to him should have realized that the
distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily
harm.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no application to illness
or bodily harm of another which is caused by emotional distress
arising solely from harm or peril to a third person, unless the negli-
gence of the actor has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of
bodily harm to the other.74
70. See, e.g., Tommy's Elbow Room v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038, 1043 (Alaska
1986) (allowing recovery for negligently-inflicted emotional distress).
71. See supra note 6.
72. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d at 1040-43. Compare Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star
Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTs § 46 (1965), as the standard for recovery for intentionally-inflicted emotional
harm) with Kavorkian, 727 P.2d at 1040-43 (citing REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRrs § 313, but then disagreeing with the "zone of danger" restriction set forth
therein).
73. RFrrTEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) (emphasis added).
74. Id § 313 (emphasis added).
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The Restatement requirement that the distress result in "illness or
bodily harm" is the "physical manifestation" requirement.7 5 If Alaska
follows section 313, then Alaska does retain a physical manifestation
requirement.
In Tommy's Elbow Room v. Kavorkian, the Alaska Supreme
Court quoted section 313.76 Although the supreme court did not
mention the "physical manifestation" requirement of the Restatement,
it did discuss and reject the "zone of danger" rule which is embodied
in section 313(2).77 The cases cited during Kavorkian's discussion of
"zone of danger" may shed some light on the Alaska Supreme Court's
views on the "physical manifestation" requirement.
The "zone of danger" rule prohibits recovery for emotional dis-
tress experienced as a result of harm inflicted on a third party unless
the plaintiff was also personally threatened by the same harm which
befell the decedent. After rejecting the "zone of danger" rule, the
court adopted an approach, first set down by the California Supreme
Court in Dillon v. Legg,78 which is based on the foreseeability of the
emotional harm to "bystander" plaintiffs.79
In Dillon, the California Supreme Court restricted its ruling to
emotional harm to third parties which manifested itself in physical
illness or injury - it required "physical manifestation." 80 Neverthe-
less, in the 1980 case of Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,8' the
California court allowed a general cause of action for negligently-in-
flicted serious emotional distress, apparently eliminating the "physical
manifestation" requirement. Molien relied on principles of foreseeabil-
ity similar to those in Dillon,82 but is not cited in Kavorkian.8 3
The Alaska Supreme Court's failure to adopt or cite the principle
of Molien in Kavorkian is not an express adherence to the physical
75. See, eg., Nye v. Commonwealth, 331 Pa. Super. 209, 216, 480 A.2d 318, 322
(1984). See generally PROSSER & KEnTON, supra note 14, at § 54.
76. 727 P.2d 1038, 1040 (Alaska 1986).
77. Id at 1040-43.
78. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
79. Alaska has explicitly allowed recovery for the emotional distress of a family
member witnessing another family member being pulled from an automobile wreck.
See Kavorkian, 727 P.2d at 1040-43. Such "bystander" liability is inconsistent with
the use of an "impact" requirement. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, at § 54.
80. Dillion, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. See Molien v.
Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 922, 616 P.2d 813, 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 834
(1980) (noting that Dillon required a "physical manifestation").
81. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
82. IdL at 921-23, 616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833 (referring to the analysis
in Dillon as "apposite").
83. See also Croft by Croft v. Wicker, 737 P.2d 789, 791 (Alaska 1987) (discuss-
ing the Kavorkian-Dillon guidelines).
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manifestation rule. It could be argued that the court was simply exer-
cising judicial restraint and deciding no more than was absolutely nec-
essary.84 If the failure to cite Molien was only a result of cautious
judicial restraint, then it can be argued that the Alaska Supreme Court
will follow the foreseeability principle relied on in Dillon and adopt
Molien when confronted with the proper case.85 Therefore, it is not
clear whether Alaska retains a physical manifestation requirement.8 6
If such a physical manifestation requirement is not retained, there
would be no special barriers placed on the recovery of damages for
negligently-inflicted serious emotional distress. If Alaska thus allows
a general cause of action for negligently-inflicted serious87 emotional
distress, it will not be particularly important for courts to determine
whether pre-impact fear is negligently-inflicted emotional distress or
simply an element of pain and suffering resulting from a negligently-
84. Some support for this argument can be gathered from the fact that two cases
cited by the court did involve a rejection of a physical manifestation requirement. See
Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 438 (Me. 1982); Portee v.
Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 95, 417 A.2d 521, 525 (1980). The argument is not particularly
compelling, however, because these cases were cited for the very specific proposition
that "a substantial and growing minority of states" have rejected the "zone of danger"
rule. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d at 1040-41 & n.2.
85. Some support for such an argument can be gleaned from Mattingly v. Sheldon
Jackson College, where the supreme court held that damages are recoverable for
"purely economic loss" in the absence of property damage or personal injury. 743
P.2d 356, 359-61 (Alaska 1987) (citing People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 100 N.Y. 246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985)). The court held that in that context, the
principles of foreseeability would govern, rather than a blanket prohibition against
liability. Id. at 360. Of course, the reasoning of Mattingly would not prohibit the
court from adopting a different policy towards negligently-inflicted emotional distress.
86. Many jurisdictions do retain such a requirement. Cf., e.g., PROSSER & KEE-
TON, supra note 14, § 54, at 364-65 (only a "handful" of courts have permitted a
"general negligence cause of action for the infliction of serious emotional distress").
87. The requirement that the emotional distress be "serious" comes from Molen,
27 Cal. 3d at 927-28, 616 P.2d at 819-20, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38. This requirement
is probably not a bar to recovery for pre-impact fear. With regard to intentionally-
inflicted emotional distress, Alaska has adopted the standard set forth in section 46(1)
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough,
705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985). This standard requires that the emotional distress
be "severe." See id. at 457 n.6 (holding that the emotional distress to which the plain-
tiffs had attested was not "severe"). The Alaska Supreme Court has ruled that as a
matter of law, a threat on another's life can foreseeably cause severe emotional dis-
tress. Teamsters Local 959 v. Wells, 749 P.2d 349, 358 (Alaska 1988).
Wells involved intentionally-inflicted emotional distress, an intentional tort. It is
therefore not possible to say with certainty that the concepts of "severe" and "serious"
emotional distress are identical. The Wells court also held that foreseeability, usually
a question of fact, was determinable as a matter of law. Id. at 357-58. Again, the
transition from the context of the intentional tort in Wells to the context of a negli-
gence action in the average pre-impact fear case may mean that the court would not
allow the full Wells presumption of foreseeability. However, neither reason nor the
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inflicted ordeal which terminated in death.88 The distinction between
the ordeal theory and the emotional distress theory lies in how pre-
impact fear is categorized for the purposes of recovery. However, if
Alaska does not retain a physical manifestation requirement, the legal
consequences of this categorization are insignificant, and choosing be-
tween the two theories is not necessary. Because the current status of
the physical manifestation requirement is unclear, it is impossible to
say whether this is the case under current Alaska law. It is therefore
necessary to suggest a resolution of the conflict between the "ordeal"
and "emotional distress" theories of pre-impact fear.
C. If Alaska Retains a Physical Manifestation Requirement, It
Should Adopt an Ordeal Theory of Pre-Impact Fear
An Alaska court could justify a decision to use either an emo-
tional distress or an ordeal theory. Neither is necessarily "wrong."
However, in any jurisdiction which retains special restrictions on re-
covery for negligently-inflicted emotional distress, the ordeal theory is
the better theory to adopt, primarily because an emotional distress the-
ory would unduly restrict recovery.
From a theoretical perspective, it can be argued that general prin-
ciples of tort law support the theory that pre-impact fear should be
treated as negligently-inflicted emotional distress. Not only is pre-im-
pact fear a form of mental anguish which is inflicted negligently, but,
as pointed out by the dissent in Solomon, it is a discrete form of in-
jury.89 Pre-impact fear is the fear of impending death and injury, but
it exists even if the impending injury never occurs. 90 Nevertheless, the
rationale for restricting recovery for negligently-inflicted emotional
language of Wells requires the conclusion that the emotional effect of a threat of im-
pending death differs depending on whether the threat of death is a result of inten-
tional or negligent conduct.
A less conclusive presumption of the severity of emotional distress caused by a
negligently-caused threat to life would be appropriately inferred from Wells. Such a
presumption also seems implicit in the pre-impact fear cases. There is no case which
questions, or even discusses, the fact that emotional distress resulting from a realiza-
tion that death is imminent can be "serious" or "severe." A jury that determines that
a decedent perceived an impending impact as a threat to his or her life should be able
to draw an inference that the resulting emotional distress was severe. Cf id.
88. This fact may support the recognition of a general negligence cause of action
for emotional distress. Pre-impact fear is negligently-inflicted emotional distress, but
it is artificial to sever a causally-connected chain of events into "pre-impact" and
"post-impact" elements. The problem is avoided if negligently-inflicted emotional dis-
tress is subject to the same rules for recovery that govern negligently-inflicted physical
injury.
89. Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 797 (5th Cir. 1976) (Gee, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). See In re Eastern Airlines Engine Failure, 629 F.
Supp. 307, 309-10 (1986) (imminent airplane crash averted by restarting engine).
90. Solomon, 540 F.2d at 797 (Gee, J., dissenting).
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distress is not compelling in the context of a survivorship claim for a
decedent's pre-impact fear.
Unfortunately, viewing pre-impact fear as negligently-inflicted
emotional distress has adverse implications for survivorship plaintiffs.
Categorizing pre-impact fear as negligently-inflicted emotional distress
triggers restrictions which would bar the recovery of damages for pre-
impact fear except in very unusual cases. These restrictions are appro-
priate in the context of pre-impact fear cases only if they bar recovery
for reasons that are valid in that context. 91
The Restatement (Second) of Torts offers the following rationale
for not allowing recovery for negligently-inflicted emotional distress
that does not result in physical injury:
One is that emotional disturbance which is not so severe and serious
as to have physical consequences is normally in the realm of the
trivial, and so falls within the maxim that the law does not concern
itself with trifles. It is likely to be so temporary, so evanescent, and
so relatively harmless and unimportant, that the task of compensat-
ing for it would unduly burden the courts and the defendants. The
second is that in the absence of the guarantee of genuineness pro-
vided by resulting bodily harm, such emotional disturbance may be
too easily feigned, depending, as it must, very largely upon the sub-
jective testimony of the plaintiff, and that to allow recovery for it
might open too wide a door for false claimants who have suffered no
real harm at all. The third is that where the defendant has been
merely negligent, without any element of intent to do harm, his
fault is not so great that he should be required to make good a
purely mental disturbance.92
At least two, and possibly all three, of these reasons for limiting recov-
ery are less compelling in the context of a pre-impact fear claim. The
third concern, and to a degree the first, rest on the notion of a
"purely" mental disturbance. When the issue is a decedent's pre-im-
pact fear, it is impossible to say that the fear experienced was, or
would have remained, a purely mental injury. Psychological disorders
that have objectively determinable symptoms or consequences have
been held to satisfy the "physical manifestation" requirement. 93 Of
course, any psychological disorder caused by pre-impact fear becomes
undetectable upon the death of the plaintiff. The violent nature of
91. The validity of the reasons given for restricting recovery for negligently-in-
flicted emotional distress has been questioned by both courts and commentators. See,
e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 921-31, 616 P.2d 813, 816-21,
167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 834-39 (1980); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress:
The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237 (1971). For purposes of the
present note, it is assumed that the reasons given for restricting recovery for negli-
gently-inflicted emotional distress are valid under certain circumstances.
92. RESTArEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A comment b (1965).
93. See, e.g., Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Colo. 1978); Payton v.
Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 556, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (1982).
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death in many of the pre-impact cases could erase even manifested
physical illness or injury. 94 The Restatement was concerned with the
unfairness of making defendants liable for "purely" emotional harm.
Implicit in this concern is an assumption that time and medical exami-
nation will enable a fair assessment of whether or not the harm re-
mained purely emotional. In the context of a pre-impact fear claim,
death resulting from the defendant's negligent conduct makes it nearly
impossible to determine whether the emotional distress had manifested
itself in physical symptoms.
The second concern expressed in the Restatement, the lack of
"guarantees of genuineness," is clearly not present in the context of
pre-impact fear. Guarantees of genuineness are provided by the acci-
dent itself. No decedent "feigns" pre-impact fear. When the circum-
stances of death prove that the decedent's emotional distress was
genuine, requiring a decedent's estate to prove "impact" or "physical
manifestation" is both redundant and oppressive.95 This is particu-
larly true if pre-impact fear is viewed as the anticipation of death, not
just the anticipation of an upcoming impact.96 The knowledge that
one is likely to die would certainly cause very severe distress. 97
It is not clear whether rules restricting recovery for negligently-
inflicted emotional distress are necessary.in the modern legal system.
It is certain, however, that imposing such restrictions when they serve
no real purpose is arbitrary and unjust. If Alaska does still restrict
recovery for negligently-inflicted emotional distress by using a "physi-
cal manifestation" requirement, then it would seem most appropriate
for Alaska to view pre-impact fear as pain and suffering inflicted dur-
ing the course of a negligently-inflicted ordeal. 98
The adoption of an ordeal theory would allow the possibility of
recovery in a greater number of cases. Although courts or defense
attorneys may find the thought of the increase in the number and size
94. See, e.g., Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953, 955 (D.
Kan. 1986) (following impact with another truck, the decedent's head and thorax
were crushed by the load of steel he was transporting).
95. It would still be necessary to prove that a decedent was able to anticipate the
impending accident. Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir.
1983). Once sufficient proof is provided, the accident itself provides an incontrovert-
ible guarantee of genuineness.
96. See, e.g., Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 797 (5th Cir. 1976) (Gee, J.,
dissenting) ("Mhe Levins' anxiety for their own safety and their childrens' future
well-being was caused by the anticipation of death, not by the actual crash that pre-
sumably killed them."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 481 (1977).
97. See Teamsters Local 959 v. Wells, 749 P.2d 349, 358 (Alaska 1988).
98. The same result can be reached by treating pre-impact fear as negligently-
inflicted emotional distress, and by holding that the guarantees of genuineness associ-
ated with the fatal accident are sufficient to satisfy the requirement of "physical
manifestation."
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of survivorship awards alarming, such a concern does not justify the
adoption of an unduly restrictive emotional distress theory. Compen-
sation for pre-impact fear can be limited to appropriate situations by
imposing carefully-tailored evidentiary requirements.
III. CONTROLLING DAMAGE AWARDS FOR PRE-IMPACT FEAR
If Alaska allows damages for a decedent's pre-impact fear under
the proper circumstances, substantial liabilities may be generated by
such claims,99 which will necessitate the establishment of some limita-
tions on pre-impact fear recovery.
A. Sufficient Evidence to Allow the Conclusion That the Decedent
Experienced Such Fear
"A damage awaid for the decedent's pre-impact mental anguish
may not be granted when the evidence is speculative or conjec-
tural."'100 Some cases addressing claims for pre-impact fear have con-
cluded that the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain the
claim.101 Usually, the existence of pre-impact fear is a question for the
finder of fact. 10 2
"Under the cases, a plaintiff, to recover for apprehension of im-
pending death, must show that before .the injury, decedent was 'aware
of the danger and suffered from pre-impact terror.' "o103 Courts have
been fairly generous in allowing circumstantial evidence to prove such
awareness. 1o If the circumstances of an accident support an inference
99. See supra note 8.
100. Larsen v. Delta Air Lines, 692 F. Supp. 714, 721 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (citing
Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, 746 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1984)).
101. See supra note 5.
102. See Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, 828 F.2d 278, 288 n.43 (5th Cir.
1987) (trier of fact may find pre-impact fear); In re Air Crash Disaster near New
Orleans, 789 F.2d 1092, 1098 (5th Cir. 1986) (existence of pre-impact fear treated as a
jury question); Pregeant v. Pan Am. World Airways, 762 F.2d 1245, 1249 (5th Cir.
1985) (jury question); Haley, 746 F.2d at 313 (jury question); Shu-Tao Lin v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1984) (jury question).
103. Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 574 F. Supp. 1407, 1417 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff'd, 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Anderson v. Rowe, 73 A.D.2d 1030, 1031,
425 N.Y.S.2d 180, 181 (1980)).
104. See, e.g., Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1984);
Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801
(1977). In a jurisdiction using an "emotional distress" theory of pre-impact fear, it
may be necessary to prove more than just awareness of impending impact. Restric-
tions on recovery for emotional distress may also require the plaintiff to prove an
impact on the decedent, In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, 507 F. Supp. 21, 23
(N.D. Ill. 1980), a physical manifestation of the pre-impact fear, Fogarty v. Campbell
66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953 (D. Kan. 1986), or that the pre-impact fear consti-
tuted "severe" emotional distress, Teamsters Local 959 v. Wells, 749 P.2d 349, 358
(Alaska 1988).
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that a decedent would have been aware of the impending impact,
courts generally hold that a question of fact exists. 10 5 This willingness
to accept circumstantial evidence probably stems from the fact that
fatal accidents often eliminate eyewitnesses or other direct evidence.0 6
Various types of evidence have been used to allow the inference
that a particular decedent was aware of the impending impact. Courts
have allowed accident reenactments or reconstructions, 10 7 testimony
from observers, 10 8 expert testimony, °9 and physical evidence 10 as cir-
cumstantial proof of pre-impact fear.
While courts have been consistent in allowing proof of pre-impact
fear through circumstantial evidence, they have not been consistent
with regard to what constitutes sufficient circumstantial evidence to
create a question of fact as to whether a given decedent experienced
pre-impact fear. The Solomon case allowed recovery based on only a
single piece of circumstantial evidence: a radio communication from
the pilot which could presumably have been heard by other passengers
in the small plane."' The communication indicated that the pilot be-
lieved that the fuel was running out, and that he intended to ditch the
105. See, e.g., Lin, 742 F.2d at 53.
106. See Douglass v. Delta Air Lines, 709 F. Supp. 745, 765-66 (W.D. Tex. 1989)
(plaintiff must present "some evidence" of pre-impact fear, but eyewitness testimony is
not necessary); Larsen v. Delta Air Lines, 692 F. Supp. 714, 721 (S.D. Tex. 1988)
(same).
107. Pregeant v. Pan Am. World Airways, 762 F.2d 1245, 1248-49 (5th Cir. 1985)
(reenactment of timing of accident with stopwatch); Haley v. Pan Am. World Air-
ways, 746 F.2d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 1984) (videotape simulation of crash); Shatkin v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202, 204 (2d Cir. 1984) (report of National
Transportation Safety Board based on flight recorder data); Malacynski v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 565 F. Supp. 105, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same); Nelson v. Dolan, 230
Neb. 848, 849-50, 434 N.W.2d 25, 27 (1989) (accident reconstructionist's testimony).
108. E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, 789 F.2d 1092, 1098 (5th
Cir. 1985) (testimony from eyewitnesses who heard and observed crash from the
ground). Cf Malacynski v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 565 F. Supp. 105, 107
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (offer to produce eyewitness to crash prevented "summary dismissal"
of claim).
109. Pregeant v. Pan Am. World Airways, 762 F.2d 1245, 1248 (5th Cir. 1985)
(testimony of psychiatrist on effects of stress); Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, 746
F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1984) (same); Nelson v. Dolan, 230 Neb. 848, 849-50, 434
N.W.2d 25, 27 (1989) (testimony of accident reconstructionist and psychiatrist). See
also In re Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, 789 F.2d 1092, 1099 (5th Cir. 1986)
(criticizing lack of psychiatric testimony as to condition of passengers), aff'd in rele-
vantpart, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 109 S.Ct.
1928 (1989).
110. Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 481 (1977) (pilot's transmission informing passengers of impending crash); Fo-
garty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953, 963 (D. Kan. 1986) (skid marks
allowed inference that decedent was aware of the impending crash).
11. Solomon, 540 F.2d at 781-82.
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plane in the sea near a merchant ship he had sighted.1 12 Although this
communication could certainly support an inference that the passen-
gers were aware that the pilot intended to set the plane down in the
water, it is questionable whether knowledge of an impending landing
at sea in the vicinity of a ship is knowledge of impending death. As
the dissent noted, "the truth may involve a confident approach to
ditch alongside a freighter which was assumed to have seen the air-
craft, followed by a sudden stall and instant death." 113
Solomon is uniquely generous in allowing such limited circum-
stantial evidence to support recovery, and it may be driven by its own
unique facts. 114 Contrasting with Solomon's lax standard are the fairly
stringent requirements for the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence
set forth in Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.115 In Shatkin,
although the left engine and a portion of the left wing of an airliner
broke away twenty or thirty seconds before the airliner crashed, the
plane's flight pattern did not become alarming until only three seconds
before the crash. 116 The court of appeals held that the district court
erred in not granting J.N.O.V. to the defendants on the issue of the
decedent's pre-impact fear:
There is no evidence permitting an inference that Shatkin was aware
that the left engine had been lost on take-off, since he was seated on
the right side of the wide-bodied plane, it would be sheer specula-
tion to infer that he knew of the incident. There was no evidence
that the pilot or anyone else called the danger to the passenger's
attention. As far as the record is concerned Shatkin could have
dozed ofr in his seat.l1 7
The Shatkin court may have overstated the extent to which cir-
cumstantial evidence must show that a decedent was aware of the im-
pending impact before the jury is allowed to infer awareness from the
circumstanes.118 However, many courts have required evidence that
112. Id at 782 n.5.
113. Id at 797 (Gee, J., dissenting).
114. Despite an extensive search, the aircraft and its passengers were never found.
Therefore, the only evidence from which any inferences could be drawn was the radio
transmission from the pilot. See id at 782.
115. 727 F.2d 202, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1984).
116. Id. See also Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1984).
117. Shatkin, 727 F.2d at 206-07. The statement that there was no proof that
Shatkin was even awake is in dicta. Id. at 204. In cases such as Shatkin, it might be
reasonable to allow, but not require, the jury to infer that the passenger would have
been awake upon take-off. See Lin, 742 F.2d at 53 (allowing recovery for pre-impact
fear without particularized proof that the decedent was actually awake).
118. In this respect, the comparison between Lin and Shatkin is particularly rele-
vant. In these two cases, the same circuit, addressing two deaths caused by the same
airliner crash, reached very different conclusions on the sufficiency of the evidence.
Compare Shatkin, 727 F.2d at 206-07 (insufficient evidence) with Lin, 742 F.2d at 53
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the particular decedent was aware of the accident.1 19 The fact that
some passengers might have known of an impending impact has not
been sufficient to allow an inference that other passengers were simi-
larly aware. 120
Alaska should take care to enforce these evidentiary requirements
to insure that pre-impact fear claims succeed only under appropriate
circumstances. Alaska should require sufficient proof that it was more
likely than not that the particular decedent at issue was aware. In
cases in which flight patterns, screeching brakes, or a warning from
another party do not allow such an inference, courts should be
cautious.121
(sufficient evidence). The Lin case acknowledges the result in Shatkin, but distin-
guishes that case by noting that, unlike the Shatkin decedent, the deceased Dr. Lin sat
on the side of the plane from which the wing and engine detached, thus allowing the
jury to infer that he might have been looking out the window as the engine broke
away. See Lin, 742 F.2d at 53. There was no more evidence showing that Dr. Lin was
actually looking out the window than there was evidence showing that Mr. Shatkin
was actually awake. However, the Lin court allowed the inference to be drawn. Lin,
742 F.2d at 53.
119. See Pregeant v. Pan Am. World Airways, 762 F.2d 1245, 1248 (5th Cir. 1985)
(cockpit conversations audible only to cockpit crew could not be used to establish
passenger's state of mind); Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, 746 F.2d 311, 317 (5th
Cir. 1984) (flight pattern and roll of airliner allowed inference that individual decedent
was aware of his approaching death); Lin, 742 F.2d at 53 (particular decedent was
seated in a position which allowed him to see wing and engine as it was torn away);
Shatkin, 727 F.2d at 207 (disallowing recovery when there was no evidence that the
specific decedent was aware of an impending crash).
120. See Douglass v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 745, 759-60 (W.D. Tex.
1989) (conflicting testimony from survivors in the rear of an airliner could not provide
evidence of the state of mind of a decedent seated in the front of the airliner); Feldman
v. Allegheny Airlines, 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1301 (D. Conn. 1974) (testimony of survivor
who was looking out window and aware of plane's danger did not justify inference as
to the state of mind of a different passenger). Neither of these cases seem to involve
evidence of a passenger or crew member aware of the impending impact who actually
attempted to alert the others. In such a situation, it might be reasonable for evidence
of the warning to allow the jury to infer that a particular decedent was aware. Cf
Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 434 U.S. 481
(1977) (In discussing the passengers' awareness of impending impact, the court stated
that the "inference was reasonable, almost compelling, that they appreciated that pos-
sibility at least from the time of the radio transmission.").
121. The Lin case may go too far in allowing circumstantial evidence to create a
question of fact. Lin held that it was sufficient that the passenger's window could have
provided a view of the damaged wing. There is no indication that evidence was
presented which allowed an inference that it was more likely than not that Dr. Lin
was in fact looking out the window. See Lin, 574 F. Supp. at 1417. It is possible that
evidence regarding the general behavior of passengers with window seats during take-
off could have provided sufficient evidence that Dr. Lin was looking out the window.
It is also possible that evidence could have been presented to show that the fire and
destruction on the wing would have been sufficient to draw attention.
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B. A Substantial Interval During Which the Decedent Was Aware
of Impending Death
Under Alaska law, "[ilt is true that no award should be made for
any pain and suffering 'substantially contemporaneous with death or
mere incidents to it.' "122 This assertion is consistent with the cases
from other jurisdictions allowing recovery for pre-impact fear. The
intervals deemed sufficient to support a claim of pre-impact fear have
been quite small, but not inconsequential.1 23 The Shatkin court re-
fused to allow a claim for pre-impact fear when the decedent would
have been aware of the impending peril only three seconds prior to
impact.1 24 It is clear that the court's selection of this interval was
somewhat arbitrary,1 25 but it is also clear that such an interval does
need to be established. A plaintiff must prove not only that the dece-
dent was aware of his or her danger, but also that there was a signifi-
cant interval of time between the apprehension of danger and death. 126
A court addressing this issue could take one of two tacks. As in
Shatkin, the court could simply use a predetermined interval of time,
even if a rather arbitrary one. A second approach might be to allow
expert psychological testimony as to whether or not the decedent had
sufficient time to perceive and understand the consequences of the im-
pending impact.
C. Pre-Impact Fear in the Context of Automobile Collisions or
Other Accidents Less Likely to Result in Death
Claims for pre-impact fear may have originally been generated by
unusual factual circumstances such as airliner crashes, but recent
122. Northern Lights.Motel v. Sweeney, 561 P.2d 1176, 1190 (Alaska 1977) (citing
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915)), aff'd, 563 P.2d 256
(Alaska 1977).
123. See, eg., In re Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, 789 F.2d 1092, 1098
(5th Cir. 1986) ("final seconds"); Pregeant v. Pan Am. World Airways, 762 F.2d
1245, 1248 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985) (20 seconds); Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, 746
F.2d 311, 317 (four to six seconds); Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 53
(2d Cir. 1984) (30 seconds); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Lane, 720 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1986) (six to eight seconds). But see Green v. Hale, 590 S.W.2d 231, 237-38
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (allowing recovery for mental anguish which was apparently
virtually contemporaneous with death).
124. 727 F.2d at 206 (disallowing a claim for pre-impact fear because there was no
evidence that the decedent was aware of the impending disaster, despite the fact that
the airliner went into a "90-degree left plunge" three seconds before the crash).
125. Haley allowed recovery for pre-impact fear of four to six seconds in duration.
746 F.2d at 317-18.
126. Cf Shatkin, 727 F.2d at 206-07.
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claims have been raised by the estates of decedents killed in more com-
mon events such as automobile accidents.127 The courts addressing
such claims have often looked to the earlier airliner cases.1 28
Although no case has been found which attempts to address the point,
there may be a reason to treat claims for pre-impact fear differently
when an automobile accident is involved.
Aviation accidents usually result in deaths. A study of major
United States airline accidents from 1970 to 1984 examined data re-
garding 3108 persons involved in the crash of airplanes. Of those 3108
persons, 2373 were killed, 626 were injured and 108 were not in-
jured.12 9 Such a high fatality rate is in sharp contrast to the very low
fatality rate in automobile collisions.' 30 In the context of pre-impact
fear, this difference in fatality rates may be significant. If most persons
aboard an airliner are killed when a crash occurs, then it is reasonable
to draw the inference that awareness of impending impact caused a
decedent to experience severe fear and anxiety from the contemplation
of approaching death. The same inference cannot be so readily drawn
from an automobile accident.
Current Alaska law may provide some support for this proposi-
tion. Teamsters Local 959 v. Wells held that it is foreseeable that a
person whose life is threatened would experience severe emotional dis-
tress.13' There are really two issues of foreseeability settled as a matter
of law in Wells. First, a threat to life will foreseeably cause emotional
distress, and second, the emotional distress caused will be severe.' 32
127. See, ag., DeLong v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, No. C2-88-359, slip op. at 1-2
(S.D. Ohio July 17, 1989) (auto-truck collision); Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc.,
640 F. Supp. 953, 955 (D. Kan. 1986) (truck collision); Nye v. Commonwealth, 331
Pa. Super. 209, 215-16, 480 A.2d 318, 321-22 (1984) (automobile collision).
128. See, ag., Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953, 957-61 (D.
Kan. 1986) (surveying cases).
129. J. KALALIK, E. KING, M. TRAYNOR, P. EBENER & L. Picus, AVIATION Ac-
CIDENT LITIGATION SURVEY: DATA COLLECTION FoRMs 2 (1988) (indicating a fa-
tality rate of approximately 76%). This survey was undertaken by the Institute for
Civil Justice, a division of the RAND Corporation.
130. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FAcTS 48 (1988) (surveying
motor vehicle accident rates for the United States in 1987). This study does not con-
tain data on the total number of persons involved in all types of motor vehicle acci-
dents, so it is impossible to determine from the study exactly what percentage of
persons involved in all motor vehicle accidents are killed. The study does, however,
allow a determination of what percentage of those accidents studied resulted in a fatal-
ity. Of 20,800,000 accidents, 43,300 involved a fatality. Therefore, there was approxi-
mately a 0.48% chance that a motor vehicle accident reported to the National Safety
Council involved a fatality.
131. 749 P.2d at 358.
132. See id. The Wells court identified four separate elements for the tort of inten-
tionally-inflicted emotional harm. Two of the elements were: (1) that conduct cause
emotional distress and (2) that the emotional distress so caused be "severe." Id at 357
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The question then becomes how relevant this intentional-tort pre-
sumption is to conduct which is merely negligent. Wells involves an
intentional tort, so the court may have been more willing to find fore-
seeability than it would in the case of mere negligence. 133 At the least,
it can be argued that Wells has some relevance in the context of a
similar threat to life in a negligence action. 134 If this is the case, then
the Wells presumption of foreseeability can be construed as at least
allowing the jury to infer from the fact of the perceived threat to life
that the decedent experienced fear for his life, and resulting serious
distress. 135
When an automobile accident is analyzed under Wells, the threat
of death is not as certain. It would be consistent with both Wells and
the concept of pre-impact fear to hold that the threat of death in an
automobile accident is uncertain. Evidence of knowledge of an im-
pending accident is not sufficient, without more, to allow an inference
that the knowledge caused serious emotional distress. Put another
way, the grim circumstances of the early pre-impact fear cases pro-
vided a sufficient guarantee of genuineness that the emotional distress
experienced by anyone aware of the fact that they were trapped in
such circumstances was both real and serious.136
This does not mean that it should be impossible for a plaintiff to
recover for pre-impact fear stemming from less frequently fatal types
of accidents such as those involving automobiles. Plaintiffs would
need to make a more detailed showing regarding the circumstances of
the accident. It would not be sufficient to show that the decedent was
generally aware that an accident might be imminent. 137 However, it
(citing Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 703 F.2d 1152, 1158
(10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 824 (1983)).
133. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, § 54, at 360.
134. Cf., e.g., Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953, 962 (D.
Kan. 1986) (viewing the Kansas Supreme Court's treatment of intentional infliction of
emotional harm as relevant to that court's approach to negligently-inflicted emotional
harm); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 921-31, 616 P.2d 813, 816-21,
167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 834-39 (1980) (examining guarantees of genuineness under the law
of intentionally-inflicted emotional distress in the context of a discussion of guarantees
of genuineness under the law of negligently-inflicted emotional distress).
135. See supra note 87.
136. See, e., Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1301 (D. Conn.
1974) (airliner crash); Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. 335, 364-66
(W.D. Mich. 1970) (train accident); Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981,
1015 (D. Hawaii 1965) (small plane crash).
137. The pre-impact skid marks left by the decedent's truck in Fogarty are an ex-
ample of evidence sufficient to allow an inference that the decedent was generally
aware that a collision might be imminent. 640 F. Supp. at 963. The argument
presented above would require the plaintiff to prove more than the type of general
awareness indicated by the skid marks. It would be necessary to prove that the dece-
dent had some knowledge that the circumstances of the particular impending accident
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would still be possible for the estate to present evidence that the facts
and circumstances of the accident would have allowed the decedent to
realize that his or her life was in particular danger.138
IV. CONCLUSION
Alaska should allow a survivorship action to recover damages for
a decedent's pre-impact fear. The real question is the theory under
which such damages should be recoverable. The conflict between the
"ordeal" and "emotional distress" theories is really a result of restric-
tions on recovery for emotional distress. Restrictions such as the
"physical manifestation" requirement do more harm than good in the
context of pre-impact fear. By using the ordeal theory, or modifying
the restrictions governing recovery for negligently-inflicted emotional
distress, this problem can be avoided.
To be sure, attorneys and judges concerned with allowing "yet
another" method for recovery of tort damages are not without valid
arguments. Pre-impact fear claims should not be an "open door" to
increased liability. Concerns about the proliferation of claims for pre-
impact fear can be addressed through evidentiary requirements and a
careful consideration of when the circumstances of a negligently-pro-
duced death warrant the conclusion that the decedent was likely to be
aware of his or her approaching demise. These requirements will ade-
quately insure that recovery for pre-impact fear can be recognized
without fear that it will be subject to overuse and abuse.
Thomas D. Sydnor, II
were such that he or she would probably be killed. In the context of Fogarty, the fact
that the decedent was driving a truck loaded with steel, and the fact that the vehicle
with which impact was imminent was also a truck might be sufficient to allow such an
inference. Id. at 955.
138. See Nelson v. Dolan, 230 Neb. 848, 859, 434 N.W.2d 25, 32 (1989) (facts of
case sufficient to warrant inference that decedent apprehended and feared his ap-
proaching death); Green v. Hale, 590 S.W.2d 231, 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (circum-
stances of fall from truck would have made a person of decedent's age and intelligence
aware of "inevitability" of being crushed under the truck).
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